Regulations and tax and accounting rules preclude U.S. CoCo issuances. Yet since 2009, many foreign jurisdictions have embraced CoCos, largely via Basel III-related rules. By Q3 2015, over $300 billion in CoCos had been issued. Most have low book-value and discretionary triggers; over half are write-down CoCos (counter to most academic proposals). Regulatory treatment and funding cost gaps drive banks to issue CoCos, but some executives fear that the costs of a CoCo triggering will dwarf funding cost savings. Institutional investors dominate the buy-side market; most believe CoCos are mispriced and many note that market fragmentation is driving illiquidity.
As U.S. policymakers consider the efficacy of CoCos, the global market gives reason for pause. CoCos are untested; survey data suggests a global price plunge will occur when the first CoCo is triggered. Recent CoCo price drops resulting from fear that Deutsche Bank would suspend CoCo coupon payments show how CoCo regulations, accounting rules, and structure can drive market stress. Whether or not a deep enough buy-side market for large volumes of U.S. CoCos exists is unclear: issuances worth 10 percent of large U.S. banks' assets would likely exceed $650 billion. Prohibiting hedge fund holdings, as some suggest, could shrink market capacity over 10 percent.
These concerns aside, in theory issuances of high-trigger dilutive conversion CoCos, relative to equity, offer unique benefits (at a lower cost of funds and with less pressure on short-term return on equity) of (1) recapitalizing stressed balance sheets automatically and (2) driving shareholder pressure on management to avoid risk-taking that may cause conversion. Attaining these ends is difficult and entails tolerance for CoCo rule design errors and adverse market reactions to illdesigned CoCos or a CoCo triggering. If Congress aims to avoid these outcomes, prioritizes bank regulation simplicity, and is alarmed by global CoCo market risks, then allowing U.S. banks to issue CoCos is not advised; similarly-sized equity issuances are preferable (despite higher shortterm costs). But supposing superb CoCo rule design and few global disruptions, incentivizing large U.S. banks to issue high-trigger dilutive conversion CoCos could be a better policy choice.
Introduction
Broadly, this study aims to assess (1) whether or not U.S. banks should be allowed or required to issue "contingent convertible capital instruments" (CoCos) -hybrid debt-like securities treated as regulatory capital -to meet regulatory capital requirements; and (2) how Congress and/or U.S. regulators should think about establishing regulations that set forth the permitted structural qualities of these instruments, thus enabling CoCos to be issued by U.S. banks. CoCos are herein defined as regulatory capital instruments that, upon a certain trigger event occurring, (1) convert to common equity or (2) are fully or partially written-down. 1 Existing regulations and tax and accounting rules preclude U.S. bank CoCo issuances. 2 This research was originally produced to inform the deliberations of Congressman Jeb Hensarling -Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services (the Committee) -and majority staff of the Committee as they worked to develop legislation that, if passed, would enable U.S. banks meeting "high, but simple, capital requirements" to be exempted from many regulations brought about by The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) and the Bank for International Settlement's (BIS) International Regulatory Framework for Banks (Basel III), including existing complex U.S. bank regulatory capital requirements. 3 Thus the benefits, costs, risks, and operational considerations of enabling CoCo issuances by large U.S. banks 4 are assessed not just broadly, but also in the context of this particular legislative proposal. Accordingly, this research examines whether or not allowing or requiring large U.S. banks to meet the proposed regulatory capital threshold for regulatory relief with CoCo issuances would better achieve, relative to requiring an equivalent 3 See Rep. Jeb Hensarling, "Remarks at American Bankers Association Summit" (Mar. 15, 2016) (noting that "The bold and better alternative you will see from committee Republicans will provide vast regulatory relief for financial institutions in exchange for meeting high, but simple, capital requirements."). This and all other references to legislative ideas considered by Chairman Hensarling and Committee majority staff were informed by late 2015 and early 2016 discussions with staff [hereinafter "Committee staff discussions"]. 4 For purposes of this research, "large U.S. banks" refers to U.S. banks that have been deemed to be G-SIBs by the Financial Stability Board: Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, State Street Bank, and Wells Fargo. At the request of the Committee's majority staff, this research focuses its analysis on large U.S. banks.
volume of equity issuances, the Chairman's laudable goals of reforming U.S. bank capital regulation to be simpler, more "pro-growth," and more "pro-consumer."
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To start, Section 2 briefly explores the debate surrounding the bank-specific and economy-wide costs of issuing debt relative to equity, what it means for CoCos, and broad arguments for and against allowing or requiring banks to issue these instruments. The idea that allowing CoCo issuances to count as regulatory capital could, relative to requiring bank equity issuances of equal volume, place less immediate pressure on a bank's returns on equity (ROE) and lower both bank and economy-wide costs resulting from high capital levels (while providing equity-like benefits in downturns) is presented. Why those who believe that high volumes of bank equity issuances entail few economy-wide cost and little meaningful pressure on ROE oppose using CoCo issuances to meet regulatory capital requirements is also discussed.
Most arguments for and against allowing banks to issue CoCos, however, stem from particular structural elements of the instruments. Sections 2 and 3 present public policy benefits attributed by supporters of proposals to permit or require that banks issue CoCos, which include the following (some of which are mutually exclusive) advantages: (1) improving a bank's ability to absorb losses during times of market or idiosyncratic stress, (2) facilitating pressure on management to prevent CoCo conversion by avoiding excessive risk-taking or preemptively issuing equity, (3) increasing bank liquidity at times of stress, and/or (4) enabling the orderly resolution of failing financial institutions. For any of these theoretical benefits to be realized assumes that policymakers appropriately set complex structural criteria under which debt-like hybrids are treated as CoCos.
Section 3 briefly examines academics' arguments for and critiques of various CoCo structural designs and features, and notes that the most important structural element of a CoCo is its trigger, which if set at an appropriately high level, could in theory enable CoCos to drive preplanned recapitalizations of banks during times of market-stress. Low triggers, on the other hand, aim to enable the orderly resolution of failing banks. Why appropriately structuring trigger levels and metrics is difficult and why error in designing a trigger could produce high economy-wide costs is explored, as are the potential benefits and risks of dilutive versus non-dilutive CoCo conversion rates. Limitations of the academic debate surrounding CoCos are also discussed.
Notably, bank regulators in Europe and Asia -enabled by Basel III's endorsement of CoCos -have set criteria under which hybrid debt-like instruments can count towards regulatory capital requirements as CoCos. In doing so, foreign jurisdictions have given birth to a global CoCo market. Yet the structure of CoCos that dominate the global marketplace, as Section 3 and analyses in Section 4 using data provided by Moody's and Dealogic suggest, could ultimately result in more, not less, banking system risk. Why banks have chosen to issue CoCos and how structural characteristics have impacted the buy-side market is also examined.
To consider what the implications of global CoCo market structure and academic debates over the efficacy of CoCos mean in the U.S. policy context, three broad policy options -based in the context of Chairman Hensarling's reform proposal -are presented in Section 5: (1) requiring that large U.S. banks issue CoCos to meet a "high, but simple" capital requirement threshold that triggers regulatory relief, (2) allowing large U.S. banks to issue CoCos to meet this threshold, and (3) not allowing large U.S. banks to issue CoCos, and instead, requiring equity issuances equal to the volume of CoCos issuances required in Option 1 to meet the threshold.
Although the unique theoretical appeals of certain structural features are highlighted, due to the inherently complex nature of CoCos, a precise structure is not endorsed. Rather, Section 6 broadly outlines the risks, costs, benefits, and operational limitations surrounding policy options presented and, more generally, any proposal to require or allow large U.S. banks to issue CoCos. In doing so, Section 6 draws upon academic literature as well as trends in the growing global CoCo market (including the early 2016 plunge in price of Deutsche Bank CoCos). Notably, no CoCo has ever been triggered, and the untested nature of CoCos contributes to the risks and potential costs of incentivizing U.S. banks to issue this complex form of regulatory capital, as do buyers' potential reactions to CoCo market turmoil. This section also examines what the buyside market for U.S. CoCos might look like, possible operational limitations facing Congress in setting CoCo structural parameters, and notable potential benefits and costs of CoCo issuances (and certain CoCo structural features) relative to equity issuances.
The study concludes with a policy recommendation (Section 7), which sets forth assumptions and decisions that Congress should make -and risks to be aware of -before requiring or allowing large U.S. banks to issue CoCos to meet the "high, but simple" threshold being proposed for regulatory relief. High-trigger-level dilutive conversion CoCos, which have desirable properties in theory, should only be embraced in the U.S. if policymakers are (1) confident that Congressional and Federal Reserve (Fed) actions will result in well-structured CoCos being issued, (2) tolerant of the financial market risks that stem from particular CoCo designs, and (3) believe that global CoCo market concerns or the costs of any CoCo triggering will not undermine the net benefits of incentivizing large U.S. banks to issue CoCos relative to common equity issuances. Reasons to be skeptical that these conditions will be met are provided.
Understanding General Arguments For and Against CoCos
The academic debate over CoCos began shortly before the financial crisis and has accelerated in its aftermath. Most research surrounds the costs, benefits, and risks of various structural permutations that could be required by regulators in order for debt-like hybrids to be treated as CoCos (and thus also treated as regulatory capital). Before theoretical policy trade-offs surrounding important structural nuances are examined in Section 3, however, Section 2 explores broader policy arguments for and against requiring or allowing banks to issue CoCos, as well some of the benefits and risks of issuing CoCos from the perspective of a large bank.
A. Arguments for allowing or requiring banks to issue CoCos
Academic proponents of permitting or requiring banks to issue CoCos note that, depending on CoCo structural designs allowed or permitted by statute and/or regulation, CoCo issuances can result in some of the following benefits (of which some are mutually exclusive):
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(1) improving a bank's ability to absorb major losses by ensuring equity capital levels will be sufficiently high as a bank's balance sheet comes under stress (2) incentivizing CoCo and/or equity holders, as well as bank management, to engage in private risk monitoring for fear of CoCos being triggered (3) increasing bank liquidity at times of stress (4) avoiding taxpayer bailouts by enabling bank restructuring or the bailing-in of failing financial institutions (5) limiting dilution to ROE relative to equity issuances of equal volume.
Again, some of these benefits are only tied to particular CoCo design permutations. Section 3 explores in greater depth the academic debate surrounding costs and benefits of varying CoCo structural features.
Academic supporters generally agree, however, that regardless of benefits brought about by particular CoCo structures, a key benefit of allowing banks to meet regulatory capital 6 For a more comprehensive discussion of these and other benefits, see, for example, Mark requirements by issuing these instruments is that the cost of issuing CoCos is in theory expected to be less expensive for both banks and the broader economy than the cost of issuing equity. 7 Proponents point out that because CoCos would be debt-like (treated like debt from a regulatory perspective), issuing these instruments would not directly pressure a bank's ROE (at least in the short-term), and would thus enable banks to meet regulatory capital requirements at a lower cost to loan growth relative to equity issuances.
8 This is because, as opponents of high bank equity requirements note, the downward pressure on ROE caused by perpetually high levels of equity inherently increases the relative cost of lending for banks, in turn driving banks to shrink their asset size by lending less and reducing financial intermediation overall.
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In other words, CoCos could in theory mitigate both bank-specific and economy-wide costs brought about by bank overcapitalization (which CoCo supporters argue reduces overall lending due to pressures on bank returns brought about by perpetually high equity levels) during times of market stability while providing a cushion (via loss absorption mechanisms explored in Section 3) during downturns. Thus CoCo issuances could possibly provide many safety-andsoundness benefits of equity issuances (assuming CoCos are well-structured) at a cost closer to that of issuing debt. From a bank's perspective, pressure on ROE brought about by higher equity issuance levels is particularly concerning in that it could drive shareholders to demand banks cut costs by buying back debt or lowering compensation, in addition to reducing leverage (again this presumably results in economy-wide costs of lower lending levels). 10 There is not complete academic consensus, however, regarding whether or not higher bank common equity issuances in the long run would entail meaningful economy-wide costs or even lower bank ROE.
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B. Reasons given in opposition to CoCo issuances
If significant economy-wide costs do not stem from high equity issuance volumes by banks, then the appeal of permitting CoCo issuances to count towards regulatory capital requirements certainly diminishes. Professor Anat Admati of Stanford University and her coauthors, for example, argue that the costs of high bank equity requirements are overstated because (1) increased equity issuance requirements would not prevent banks from operating at an "optimal" scale, (2) ROE costs would not translate into social costs, (3) in down-turns a bank's 7 See, for example, Calomiris & Herring, supra note 6, at 42 (noting that "a draconian increase in equity requirements would raise the costs of finance for banks. That increase in cost would translate into a contraction of banking activity-most importantly, bank lending."). 8 10 See "The people versus the bankers," The Economist (Feb. 13, 2013) . 11 Anat Admati and her co-authors are highly critical of the perspective that higher common equity requirements result in economy-wide costs. Anat Admati et al., supra note 8. ROE would benefit from high equity requirements, and (4) raising equity requirements will not greatly augment loan levels.
12 CoCo issuances, they argue, are a poor substitute for higher equity requirements, which benefit financial stability by lowering the likelihood of bank failure and increasing shareholders' capacity to absorb the downside risks of banking (without relying upon a triggering event). 13 They also note that equity shares -unlike CoCos -trade in a "wellestablished liquid market" (CoCo market liquidity concerns are explored in Section 6).
14 Another policy concern held by academics who oppose allowing banks to issue CoCos is that the triggering of CoCos in a crisis situation would likely spur the triggering and sell-off of other CoCos, thus spreading the effects of a crisis (in other words, CoCos could transform idiosyncratic bank risk into systemic bank risk).
15 Also, the notion that CoCos would promote proactive risk monitoring assumes that a CoCo's trigger (various trigger types are examined below) is appropriately structured to incentivize equity issuances sufficiently in advance of severe bank distress; yet Section 3 illustrates this assumption can hardly be certain. Critically, a triggering event that occurs too late or too early would have destabilizing effects.
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As Section 6 will explore, CoCos remain untested in real-life stress events. Some industry participants worry that CoCos may end up being a bad deal for banks and share concerns surrounding how CoCos across the market will respond once the first CoCo is triggered; for example, as CoCos were being introduced, UBS CEO Oswald Grübel called the instruments "very dangerous," noting that "[a]s soon as "you get near these trigger levels -you don't have to hit them -what do you think shareholders will do? They will get the hell out of that stock."
17 A related issue is that a CoCo triggering event, while improving a bank's capital position, would not prevent banks from continuing losses on poor investments; CoCos will only delay serious financial stress.
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Again, CoCos are by nature incredibly complex instruments, so as with potential benefits, many risks and potential costs associated with CoCos depend on the structural nuances allowed and/or required by regulators, which are explored below. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 
Structuring CoCos: Theoretical Benefits, Costs, and Risks of Various Design Options
Allowing or requiring that large U.S. banks meet regulatory capital requirements via CoCo issuances inherently entails (1) reforms to U.S. tax and accounting standards and (2) that Congress and/or regulator(s) (presumably, the Fed) 19 determine what structural components enable debt-like hybrid securities to be treated as CoCos. The reforms to tax and accounting rules that must occur for a U.S. CoCo market to exist were closely examined in a 2012 report published by the Financial Stability Oversight Council.
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The benefits, costs, and risks of some CoCo structural elements that Congress and/or the Fed could presumably endorse have been explored in academic literature. Trade-offs surrounding other structural components, however, appear to be less thoroughly examined and understood. There are broadly seven major structural components to any CoCo issuance:
• Type of loss absorption mechanism. Upon a trigger event occurring, will a CoCo convert to equity or will its value be written-down?
• Loss absorption conversion rate. At what rate will shareholders be diluted upon CoCos converting to equity? Will CoCo write-downs be partial or full?
• Type of trigger. Three broad options exist: (1) discretionary, (2) mechanical, or (3) both. If mechanical, will the trigger be market-value or book-value?
• Trigger rule(s) and level(s). Will there be just one trigger or multiple triggers? For mechanical triggers, (1) what type of ratio(s) will be used and (2) will numerical thresholds used be high (to achieve preemptive recapitalization) or low (a "bail-in" instrument)? For discretionary triggers, under what circumstances can a regulator/firm activate conversion?
• Coupon deferment. Will CoCo issuers be permitted to defer coupon payments at discretion? May coupon payments be mandatory or only discretionary? Under what conditions can regulators step in to halt coupon payments?
• Maturity. Must CoCos be perpetual securities? What regulations, if any, will surround a CoCo's call date?
• Size of a CoCo requirement. How many CoCos will regulators require/permit a bank to issue towards a prescribed regulatory capital level?
As a recent study on CoCos concluded, the market incentives brought about by CoCos "can create or destroy value, depending on their design." 21 The potential benefits, costs, and risks of structural permutations are examined below.
A. Type of loss-absorption mechanism & conversion/write-down rate
Broadly, academic proposals for bank CoCo issuances support conversion CoCosinstruments that convert into common equity shares upon a triggering event occurring. If conversion occurs far in advance of bank insolvency, these instruments in theory offer the benefit of boosting book equity levels upon a trigger level being reached. 22 The threat of severe shareholder dilution upon conversion would in theory pressure management to issue equity in advance of conversion (to avoid triggering events), and better yet, drive shareholders to pressure management to avoid risks that increase the likelihood of conversion altogether.
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Thus proponents of dilutive CoCo conversion rates note that the threat of dilution brings about private risk monitoring that averts a crisis. 24 As one economist put it, "the prospect of death by dilution" would prompt shareholders "to task management to undertake the necessary measures to avoid dilution." 25 Some point out that increasing the threat of dilution to shareholders will lower the cost of CoCo issuance. 26 Research shows that the threat of dilution upon triggering events occurring incentivizes banks to maintain lower leverage in order to decrease the likelihood of conversion. 27 Yet some academics caution against dilutive conversion rates, arguing that the threat of dilution upon a trigger event occurring could generate price uncertainty and could prompt crisis-intensifying runs.
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A conversion rate could occur via the market value of shares or via a fixed amount, and the former would clearly be more dilutive to existing equity holders. Calomiris, Herring, and others argue that conversion should be based on market price in order to maximize the dilutive 21 Charles P. Himmelberg & Sergey Tsyplakov, "Incentive Effects and Pricing of Contingent Capital" (Working Paper, Jan. 2014). 22 See Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 1. 23 
B. Trigger type(s), rule(s) & level(s)
Perhaps the most critical -and most widely discussed -components of any CoCo requirement relate to its trigger. There are three broad types of triggers: book-value, marketvalue, and discretionary. Examples of book-value triggers (triggers dependent on accountingvalue calculations) include common equity tier one (CET1) capital ratios, common equity ratios, and leverage ratios. On the other hand, market-value triggers rely upon a metric that incorporates the market capitalization of a firm or some other market-based indicator of a bank's vitality. Mechanical trigger (book-value or market-value) levels could be set at high or low levels. Broadly, a high trigger level would drive bank recapitalization in advance of serious bank 29 36 See Committee staff discussions, supra note 3. stress while a low trigger level would make resolution easier or improve a bank's chance to recover from market turmoil, in theory reducing a perceived need for bailouts.
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Many market-value-trigger proponents argue for a single, high-level market-value trigger level for dilutive conversion CoCos to increase preemptive pressure from shareholders on management to avert bank failure and resolution by preemptively issuing capital. 38 These proponents (including Mark Flannery, father of the CoCo idea) argue that these triggers are transparent and credible, and if coupled with dilutive conversion, could incentivize the issuance of equity far in advance of a trigger event occurring. 39 Thus a market-value trigger could incentivize banks to maintain a sustainable market value of equity; a benefit not achieved by regulatory metrics met simply with equity issuances measured using book value and "fair value" measures.
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Yet because high-trigger conversion CoCos do not serve as a "bail-in" mechanism like low-trigger CoCos -meaning recapitalization would not take place in times of serious distresssome argue for multiple, staggered market-value trigger levels to provide banks with a "graduated safety net."
41 Professor John Coffee of Columbia Law supports staggered triggering because he fears an "all or nothing" CoCo trigger would be ineffective due to political resistance and its highly adverse market effects. 42 Without a single, high-level trigger, however, theoretical preemptive risk monitoring benefits envisioned by Calomiris and Herring -brought about by shareholders' pressure on management to avoid severely dilutive effects of conversion upon a trigger event occurring -would likely be diminished. On the other hand, criticisms of marketvalue triggers include:
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(1) market-value triggers are more volatile than book-value triggers (2) publicly-traded equity prices can be irrational, sporadic, and/or influenced by non-bank-specific factors, resulting in unnecessary or early conversions 37 See Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 1. 38 (3) managers could "deliberately talk down" the bank's value to secure cheap equity financing 44 (4) the risk of voluminous CoCo sales and equity price volatility as a marketvalue trigger is approached (5) market-value triggers could result in a "death spiral": fears of triggering would prompt runs dragging down the share price.
To overcome most of these concerns, Calomiris and Herring support using a lengthy moving-average market-based trigger, which would make manipulation more difficult and reduce concerns that the uncertain timing of share price fluctuations could drive equity selloffs. 45 Of course like any other trigger, this still necessitates a trigger-level (or acceptable range) be embraced via regulation, which could in turn result in a trigger being set too high or too low, thus bringing about destabilizing effects. 46 Another proposed alternative is to require CoCos be issued with both market-wide and bank-specific market-value triggers. 47 Both this approach and the moving-average proposal are criticized on the basis that either trigger would likely only be activated once a bank's health had already deteriorated substantially.
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Concerns over the drawbacks of market-value triggers -particularly surrounding the risk of sharp equity price declines taking place upon a conversion CoCo's market-value trigger level being neared -has led some academics to embrace book-value triggers, noting that book-value triggers are essential to avoiding "death spirals." 49 The Squam Lake Group appears to endorse a single, low-level book-value trigger to "transform an undercapitalized or insolvent bank into a well capitalized bank at no cost to taxpayers." 50 Some economists advocate for multiple, staggered book-value trigger levels to mitigate the "death spiral" risk of a single trigger level.
51
Yet book-value triggers are often disparaged because these triggers:
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(1) lag in reporting and thus contribute to uncertainty during times of stress 44 Ibid., at 486 (noting that if "the trigger is activated when equity prices are low, the manager could deliberately talk down the value of the bank to activate the trigger and obtain equity on the cheap"). 45 Calomiris & Herring, supra note 6 (addressing a concern brought up by Sundaresan & Wang, supra note 16 (2) rely upon accounting rules which enable regulators and management to improperly skew the value of assets (3) could fail to trigger in times of stress (in fact Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England finds that Tier 1 capital ratios for banks remained stable during the years prior to the crisis and actually rose in the lead up to 2008).
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Thus some book-value trigger proponents (notably, the Squam Lake Group) also embrace complementary regulator discretion triggers (in theory made somewhat predictable via a clear policy statement by regulators) because objective metric-based triggers "are likely to be imprecise, subject to revisions, and measured with time lags."
54 Similarly, some market-value trigger proponents argue for regulatory discretion to "rule" in late-stage CoCo conversion.
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There does not appear to be academic support for CoCos triggered exclusively by regulatory discretion, although one recent study advocated for CoCos triggered based on metrics that estimate "aggregate systemic risk" and "macroeconomic decline."
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Critically, any theoretical benefits attributed to CoCo trigger type(s), rule(s), and/or level(s) assume that the trigger will be activated neither too early nor too late, and that the market will broadly react as anticipated and without serious systemic distress resulting from its activation; again, the consequences of a book-or market-value trigger level that is too high or low could be severely destabilizing.
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C. Other important structural elements
As explained above, there are many other important structural elements that Congress and/or the Fed would need to consider when determining what structural components allow a large U.S. bank-issued debt-like trigger-activated hybrid instrument to be treated towards regulatory capital requirements (and thus be a CoCo). One is whether or not CoCos should be permitted (or required) to be perpetual securities. Some economists support maturing CoCos (with one advocating for random retirement as maturity approaches).
58 Non-perpetual instruments are more marketable but of course also bring about refinancing risk.
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Similarly, whether or not a CoCo's coupon is taxable and/or cancellable also impacts the ability of the instrument to theoretically achieve intended policy objectives. If a CoCo 53 Haldane, supra note 39. 54 Comparable, compatible categories of buy-side activity at the time of issuance only exist for 55 issuances. For some of these issuances, the ISIN number provided was part of a multiple-ISIN issuance in the Moody's CoCo database, precluding the ability to match buy-side activity provided by Dealogic with Moody's issuance data; these issuances are thus excluded from buy-side analyses presented in this research. The remaining 41 issuances, however, are used to develop Figures 8 through 10. These CoCo issuances were worth USD $49.6 billion at the time of issuance, and their regional/national break-down, in terms of U.S. dollar volume at time of issuance, is as follows: China (23%), Eurozone (30%), Switzerland (14%), U.K. (17%), and other (17%). Thus while overweight Eurozone, this sample is roughly equivalent in terms of national-breakdown of issuance to the existing global market. 68 PONV is a term which stems from Basel III's definitions for regulatory capital and usually means that the national bank regulator either (1) determines conversion of CoCos is necessary to avoid the firm's non-viability or (2) that the bank needs a public capital injection to stay viable, in which case CoCos must first be triggered first. 69 Avdjiev et al., CoCos: a Primer, supra note 34.
Understanding Today's Global CoCo Market
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Figure 2
Before examining how Basel III and regulatory decisions helped bring about the evolution of the global CoCo market, it is worth highlighting the geographic diversity of these issuances and that, despite recent growth, outstanding CoCo issuances constitute a relatively small market, as shown in Figures 3 and 4 .
Page 18 of 42 issued by banks (illustrated by Financial Times-reported Dealogic data in Figure 5) . 71 As Figure   7 will illustrate, however, significantly fewer CoCos were issued in 2015.
Figure 5
How regulatory shifts drove the evolution of the global CoCo market from its birth in 2009 through Q3 2015 is explored below.
A. The birth of CoCos: 2009-2010
The aftermath of the financial crisis brought about calls for heightened bank capital, and under pressure by the British government to increase capital levels, Lloyds Banking Group 70 On the other hand, the Q2 2015 outstanding dollar-value of Chinese bank-issued international debt instruments was valued at less than the dollar-value (at the time of issuance) of outstanding Chinese bank-issued CoCos (this is because Chinese financial firms' debt financing largely comes from domestic debt securities, as Figure 7 • can have a longer-term call date • may include mandatory coupon language • must be able to be triggered at the regulator's discretion (via the PONV)
• need not be a perpetual security • need not have a numerical trigger
The requirement that CoCos be triggered at the national regulator's discretion (the PONV) can be fulfilled via either (1) a statutory obligation established in the jurisdiction of the operating bank or (2) contractual language within the CoCo.
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As alluded to above, Basel III helped provide clarity to the nascent CoCo market, and has certainly spurred its 2011-15 boom. 
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Tax laws also played a factor in issuance growth: in 2013, over 64 percent of CoCos were issued in jurisdictions where debt interest payments were tax deductible. 93 The German experience is indicative of the importance of tax treatment. Until May 2014, the German tax code precluded CoCo issuances because it was not clear that coupon payments for AT1 CoCos were tax deductible, but that month, the German government finalized tax code changes to allow 2015, global CoCo issuances declined relative to 2014 due to a variety of market factors; the summer 2015 Greek debt crisis delayed issuances, as did uncertainty about a pending rate hike by the U.S. Federal Reserve. 99 There were also significantly fewer issuances by Asian banks due to Chinese growth concerns, diminished bank asset growth, and other poor market conditions. 100 Regulatory shifts have driven not just the scope but also the structure of CoCo issuances and are a major driver behind the 2015 drop-off in T2 issuances. Notably, Eurozone banks issued no T2 CoCos in 2014 or through Q3 2015. 101 On the other hand, Australian, Canadian, and
Chinese banks were responsible for over 90 percent of 2015 T2 CoCo issuances (40, 20, and 33 percent, respectively), and in 2014, Chinese banks accounted for half of T2 CoCo issuances. 102 This is in large part because Total Loss-Absorbing Capital (TLAC) rules for large global banks and the EU's 2015 "minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities" (MREL) incentivize large European banks to issue senior unsecured debt instead of CoCos to meet T2 capital requirements. 103 CoCos are more expensive to issue than senior unsecured debt: the yield to maturity of CoCos is generally significantly higher, and CoCos are generally rated five notches or more below senior unsecured debt originated by the same issuer.
towards AT1 capital requirements in stress tests. 105 Another driver is that Swiss banking regulators, who once pushed banks to issue low-trigger CoCos, announced in 2015 the phase-out of low-trigger CoCos. 106 Yet as Figure 1 illustrated, as of Q2 2015 only 15 percent of global CoCo issuances were structured with high-triggers; again, the CoCos in the global market are largely structured counter to the recommendations of most academics who favor CoCos.
C. Understanding the buy-side market
The effect of regulatory shifts on instrument design has certainly impacted CoCo market buy-side activity, which as estimates in Figures 8 through 10 illustrate, is dominated by asset/fund managers, hedge funds, and banks (largely via private banks acting on behalf of highnet worth clients) in the primary market. 107 For example, Figure 8 reveals that traditional fund and asset managers are disproportionately invested in write-down rather than conversion instruments; this is likely because of restrictions on the ability of fixed-income funds to invest in conversion CoCos. 108 Investments in discretionary trigger only CoCos, on the other hand, are avoided by hedge funds as Figure 9 shows; this attests to the fact that many sophisticated investors perceive CoCo triggers as a source of instrument mispricing. 109 Figure 10 illustrates that hedge funds also disproportionately prefer perpetual CoCos, which are inherently riskier and more difficult to price than maturing CoCos. There is seemingly very little data on secondary CoCo market activity broken-down by instrument characteristics. Economists note, however, that the secondary market for CoCos is "illiquid" and "thin."
110 This market is also impacted by regulations on the types of investors eligible to purchase CoCos, which can vary greatly by jurisdiction. While the United Kingdom recently banned retail investors from investing in CoCos, Australian retail investors have been allowed to invest heavily in these securities. 
Policy Options
The evolution of the global CoCo market reveals the major significance that policy decisions have on the structures of, supply of, and demand for CoCos. The state and fate of this splintered, troublingly-structured market, as well as academic disagreement surrounding the benefits of CoCos and particular CoCo structures, should inform U.S. banking policymakers' understanding of potential benefits, costs, risks, and operational concerns facing considering the efficacy of either requiring or allowing U.S. banks to issue CoCos.
To further explore the trade-offs associated with CoCos in the U.S. context, however, necessitates considering specifically how legislation would require or allow large U.S. banks to issue these instruments. So in addition to broadly exploring the policy trade-offs associated with requiring or allowing U.S. banks to issue CoCos, this research also examines benefits, costs, risks, and operational concerns brought about by requiring or allowing large U.S. banks to issue a significant amount of CoCos in fulfillment of Chairman Hensarling's proposed "high, but simple" capital threshold for regulatory relief. In lieu of issuing CoCos, this research assumes banks would be required to issue equity of equal volume to meet the threshold. Given these conditions, three broad legislative options (visualized in Figure 11) 
Option 3: Do not allow large U.S. banks to issue CoCos to meet a portion of a high regulatory capital threshold that prompts various regulatory exemptions. Only permit equity issuances equal to the CoCo volume being considered to meet this threshold.
Figure 11
112 Options based upon discussions with Committee majority staff. Committee staff discussions, supra note 3.
A critical component of any regulatory capital metric is of course the denominator (how bank assets are measured). The trade-offs associated with varying options -total assets measured by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or total assets measured by International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (which takes into account off-balance sheet items), for example -is outside the scope of this research, but Figure 12 highlights how these differing measurements could greatly affect the volume of U.S. CoCo issuances. 
Options
Risks, Benefits, Costs & Operational Concerns of Policy Options
Issues surrounding how Congress and/or the Fed could and should go about establishing regulatory parameters to define CoCos are explored below, as are considerations related to the CoCo buy-side market. The impact that global CoCo market trends -and recent disturbancesshould have on U.S. policymakers' perceptions of the potential costs and risks of CoCos is also discussed, as is what the untested nature of CoCos means for the attractiveness of this instrument. How policymakers could go about comparing the net benefits of simply requiring higher equity issuances (Option 3), relative to requiring or allowing CoCo issuances, to meet the threshold for regulatory relief proposed by Chairman Hensarling is also examined.
A. Concerns surrounding getting CoCo structure right
The structural components that Congress and/or the Fed deem sufficient to classify a hybrid debt-like instrument as a CoCo could be broad (for example, regulations permit numerous book-value or market-value triggers with numerous types of thresholds) or narrow (only an 8 percent CET1 ratio trigger is permitted, for example). Over-lenience, however, could prompt banks to issue poorly structured CoCos that amplify instead of mitigate banking risk. Congress is well-suited to determine the specific policy goals that CoCos should be structured to achieve and to set broad structural requirements to advance these objectives (such as specifying the type of trigger and loss absorption mechanism, for example). It is less clear that Congress should set more intricate structural requirements for CoCos (conversion rate and precise trigger level, for example) via statute. Section 3 highlighted substantial academic disagreement regarding the appropriateness of various CoCo structural components, and Congress erroneously settling this debate could bring about severe destabilizing effects through the proliferation of poorly structured CoCo issuances. Also, the potential effects of some CoCo components have clearly not been thoroughly examined. Robust analyses should accompany the determination of nuanced and technical CoCo structural details before any U.S. CoCo requirement is put in place.
(2) A legislative embrace of CoCos likely necessitates at least some degree of regulator involvement in structural design. Given the complex nature of CoCo issuance structures, and the lack of sufficient research regarding certain components, Congress would likely find it necessary to delegate to a regulator (likely the Fed) determination of some highly technical CoCo structural requirements. This raises concerns that the Fed would structure CoCo rules counter to Congressional objectives, and brings about valid criticisms of over-reliance on regulatory discretion. It also necessitates confidence that regulators can adequately address uncertainties stemming from setting appropriate structure requirements, as well as a tolerance for the risk that poorly designed CoCos proliferate as a result of this delegation of responsibility.
These issues illustrate that to exist, CoCos require a level of top-down regulatory discretion given the instrument's (1) central focus on achieving public policy objectives and (2) inherent reliance on a regulatory endorsement of certain structural characteristics to exist. The recent drop in the price of Deutsche Bank CoCos, discussed in further depth below, illustrates how poor CoCo design can prompt adverse market reactions far in advance of a bank reaching a stressed capital ratio. 115 Notably, embracing CoCos with market-value triggers -as many academics suggestnecessitates Congress and/or U.S. banking regulators endorse a CoCo structure that inherently runs counter to the type of CoCo permitted under Basel III. According to a recent survey of institutional investors, however, the biggest risk facing the global CoCo market is that it is too complex; standardization is key to bolstering demand and liquidity in the CoCo market.
116 Thus sizable issuances of market-value-trigger CoCos would further fragment an already splintered and illiquid market, 117 potentially hampering buy-side activity. More buy-side concerns facing U.S. policymakers are explored below.
B. Concerns surrounding CoCo issuance volume & buy-side activity
Small-volume CoCo issuances would likely result in few private risk-monitoring benefits, as noted in Section 3. Were legislation only to allow (and not require) large U.S. banks to issue CoCos (Option 2), Congress and/or bank regulators should require a certain threshold of CoCos be issued in order for the instruments to count towards regulatory capital. Of course uncertainty surrounds how policymakers should consider setting this threshold.
Uncertainty also surrounds how the buy-side market would respond to sizable large U.S. bank CoCo issuance volumes. Figure 12 estimates the volume of issuances brought about by varying hypothetical CoCo issuance requirements for large U.S. banks: any meaningful CoCo issuance requirement, regardless of how regulators calculate bank assets, would be massive.
Figure 12
Section 4 suggests that the U.S. CoCo primary buy-side market break-down -assuming restrictions on retail investors and bank holdings of CoCos -could reasonably be expected to be as follows: asset managers purchase roughly half of issuances, while hedge funds and private banks investing on behalf of high-net-worth clients split the other half. Certain CoCo proponents, however, want to restrict banks and hedge funds from holding CoCos.
118 Figures 8 through 10 suggest that a prohibition on hedge fund purchases of CoCos could shrink the buy-side market for U.S. CoCos by at least 10 percent. This furthers concern that there could be insufficient buyside demand and/or a precariously illiquid market for U.S. CoCos.
Bolstering liquidity concerns is that the investor base for the entire CoCo market is quite "narrow" -investors must be willing to take on large risks associated with a trigger event that will likely be highly correlated with systemic financial market downturns. 119 
C. Recent market incidents highlight troubles with CoCos
Deutsche Bank CoCos issued in May 2014 (structured as write-down instruments with a 5.125 percent CET1 trigger) dropped roughly 20 percent in price between December 2015 and early February 2016 to trade below 75 cents on the Euro before recovering to over 82 cents. 125 The early February plunge in CoCo prices coincided with major drops in the bank's equity prices and bond prices, as well as other signals of the bank's poor health. 126 To calm markets, Deutsche
Bank offered to buy back €3 billion in senior unsecured debt.
127
The sharp price drop in Deutsche Bank's CoCos was the result of a CreditSights report that called into question whether or not the bank had enough "available distributable items" -a "subset" of earnings determined via European and German regulations and accounting rules that can be used for bank bonus, dividend, and coupon payments -to meet CoCo coupon payments. 128 German accounting rules set a particularly narrow definition for what financial resources may be used to pay CoCo coupons. 129 Making matters worse, these rules precluded investors from determining on their own whether an April coupon payment could be made. 130 Concerns were intensified by a European Banking Authority (EBA) paper released in midDecember that suggested European bank regulators could step in to call coupons sooner than originally anticipated as a result of new regulations governing banks' ability to pay out bonuses, coupons, and dividends. 131 Notably, in early 2016, Deutsche Bank's CET1 ratio was over double the CoCo trigger-level; 132 fear of the trigger being reached likely had no impact on the sell-off.
Some have suggested the recent price drop in Deutsche Bank CoCos (1) was a driving factor behind the buy-back offer which occurred and (2) illustrates that CoCos effectively served as an "early warning" signal of trouble at Deutsche Bank.
133 Deutsche Bank's buy-back offer was met with little interest by investors -only €1.3 billion in bonds were purchased. 134 Also, the cumulative effect of equity, bond, and CoCo price declines drove the buy-back offer. 135 As suggested above, Deutsche Bank's CoCo issuances appear to have in fact unnecessarily accelerated concerns over the banks' fiscal health due to a number of structural and regulatory factors -a poorly-designed and opaque trigger, German accounting rules, regulatory uncertainty surrounding coupon payment restrictions resulting from the EBA paper, and uncertainty regarding whether or not regulators would permit Deutsche Bank to eventually exercise a call option -which in turn contributed to a CoCo price drop that subsequently intensified investor fears. 136 In short, throughout the CoCo market turmoil of early 2016, Deutsche Bank's CoCo issuances resulted in undesirable and unintended market reactions.
Most concerning, the sharp decline in the price of Deutsche Bank CoCos coincided with sizable drops in the price of CoCos issued by Santander, Unicredit, and Banco Popular, as well as the global CoCo price index. 137 As one French bank debt portfolio manager explained, "There are discrepancies in the [CoCo] market, not because of fear that Deutsche Bank or whoever will go down, but because some of the bonds are in stable hands and others aren't. … In a market where there isn't any liquidity and isn't working well, these are the results." Another portfolio manager noted that the resulting market-wide drop in prices was "remarkable" but "not overly surprising." 138 Now, European banks may be incapable of meeting regulatory capital objectives; as one recent European senior investment banker warned, "If prices stay at these levels, no bank will be able to issue [CoCos] and you end up with an unsustainable capital structure." 139 U.S. policymakers should consider what a global CoCo price plunge would mean for large U.S. banks were they incentivized or required to issue these untested instruments.
D. Untested nature of CoCos
No CoCo has ever been triggered, and the market reverberations of any CoCo being triggered could severely harm the price of and market for U.S. CoCos regardless of how U.S. instruments are structured. According to a recent Royal Bank of Scotland Survey, 70 percent of investors predict that the market price for CoCos -regardless of issuer -would drop 20 percent in the event of just one CoCo converting. 140 turn is contributing to the systemic CoCo mispricing. 142 Notably, 90 percent of recently surveyed institutional CoCo investors think they understand the product better than the market. 143 It thus may be the case that as one U.S. money manager and CoCo investor recently noted, "The last coco will be issued before the first one is triggered." 144 Negative market-wide risks also surround the suspension of CoCo coupon payments, which as the recent Deutsche Bank episode indicated, will likely also prompt massive CoCo price drops. U.S. policymakers should be wary that incentivizing or requiring U.S. banks to enter the volatile global CoCo marketplace has the potential to transform idiosyncratic foreign bank risks into system-wide downturns that more directly impact U.S. banks with outstanding CoCo issuances.
E. Benefits and costs of CoCo issuances relative to common equity
Requiring or allowing large U.S. banks to issue sizable amounts of CoCos in order to meet a significant portion of a regulatory capital threshold that prompts regulatory relief (Options 1 and 2) would almost certainly increase the incentives for banks to enter into this arrangement relative to only allowing equity issuances to meet the threshold (Option 3) given the cost advantage to banks of issuing CoCos relative to equity (discussed in Section 2 and highlighted in Figure 6 ). So to the extent that counting CoCo issuances towards this threshold incentivizes banks to enter into an alternative regulatory arrangement that exempts banks from complex Dodd-Frank and Basel III regulations that decrease lending activity, diminish economic growth, and limit consumer financial product access, 145 Options 1 and 2 could be highly advantageous at achieving the Chairman's goals of simpler, more "pro-growth," and more "proconsumer" financial markets regulation.
Also, exclusively relying upon book-value capital metrics (Option 3) to regulate bank vitality may be problematic because the effectiveness of these measurements is diminished by lagging and other distortions like regulatory "forbearance" (regulators' tendency to delay or hide losses so banks can lend and do not have to raise more capital during times of market stress). 146 Oftentimes, the economic value of equity can be much lower than book values
